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SECURITY INFORMATION

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[REDACTED] We are heading for the last roundup for this morning. As you can see from the picture on the chart Mr. Reber is going to discuss the subject which you have heard talked about by so many, it is the subject of the coordination process in the intelligence function. This subject is a very difficult one because of its width and its depth. I am sure that the man, who is the Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination in an Agency which has as its first goal coordination, will answer all your questions in this field, Mr. Reber.

MR. REBER: Excuse me while I get my notes back from the Chairman. I tried to sneak them up so you wouldn't see I even had any.

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[REDACTED] Colonel Baird, and new members of the Agency: Just before coming up here, [REDACTED], Colonel Baird, and [REDACTED] were taking advantage of me. Some reference was made to the possibility that my speech was like meringue on the pie, looks good, but full of air. I have been in coordination so long, either the State Department or now in CIA, that I could be persuaded of the truth of that. A wit said to me the other day that O/IC, didn't it stand for the Office of Intense Confusion? He had no malevolence I am confident. There was some truth in what he said because the office was set up not to promote it but to relieve confusion. The word "coordination" seems to me is like happiness or love - everybody knows about it and everybody admits it is pretty simple. It is true, however, that in this case, as in those, books and articles are written about it and it is eternally discussed. The search for them, happiness, love, and coordination, is eternal and the last occupies the major part of the time of bureaucrats.

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Because of this rather lengthy stay in the field of coordination, or so-called field, I thought that as a last attempt to clarify my mind

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and thereby perhaps yours I would try and see what one of the secretaries in my office would say or what she would expect to hear from a speech on coordination. She was a bit timid about offering any contribution in this - she felt inadequate and I urged her on. I said, "well, what do you think of first," and oddly enough she came back with the word "confusion." And then I said, "well, why?" "Well," she said, "because in doing jobs in Government and particularly in CIA there are always so many things to be taken into account." Said I, "such as?" "Such as opinions, personalities, functions, and circumstances." I said, "yes, but how are these resolved?" "Well, they are resolved by the IAC," she said. She is well indoctrinated. This is the be-all, end-all within the intelligence community. I said, "some of them, but what does the IAC do about them?" She didn't know. She said, "if there are three opinions she sees no way to get one opinion." "That is one opinion, why not?" "Because people are stubborn." "Well," I said, "we can't settle for that, what are the alternatives to three opinions or not getting a single opinion?" We found out that if you don't get one you may have nothing getting done, or each goes his own way taking the consequences, and national security is taking the consequences too; or you turn to a supreme authority and he says, "this is it."

So often in the bureaucracy, and this is true not only in intelligence, the person down the line says, "Oh, I wish we had somebody who would decide this," forgetting that though our superiors are wise and great there are limitations to their time and even in some cases to their ability, and it does really represent a responsibility for all of us to see whether or not we can provide the best advice, fully taking into account opinions, personalities, and circumstances so that their job

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is made easier, so that the objective can be achieved. Coordination,

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thus, really doesn't exist for itself, it is simply that the people who are related in some way to other people understand, each understands his function fairly precisely, that he sees it in relationship to others, that he is eager to find that state where we push forward together toward a stated objective with a minimum of delay.

Now the chart that has been drawn for this lecture gives the impression of a goal, or rather I conceive it as a goal. This attempts to show that when we are all done with our job, or when we are proceeding more rapidly than today, we must always proceed more rapidly, we will have policy resting on well coordinated intelligence opinion and activity. The better that foundation, the bridge, the easier the job of the policy makers, which is going to be tough no matter how good the intelligence. In the center of this you see the keystone, CIA. It is differentiated from the other intelligence agencies, not because it is best nor necessarily because it has earned itself prestige, and therefore voted in that position, but rather because of the way it and its people conduct themselves, see clearly that what they can, in fact, makes this bridge indeed a solid one.

Now you have heard a lot about the IAC, you have heard it from different quarters in respect of estimates, in respect of current intelligence, this morning in Mr. Wisner's talk on collection reference is made. I would only refresh your mind about Dr. Langer's remark on the IAC in respect of intelligence estimates. I happen to be the Secretary of that Committee and have sat through almost all of its sessions since General Smith came to the Agency. I would add my testimony to that which Dr. Langer gave regarding the process that is going on there. For here you have the heads of intelligence standing up to be counted not just

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the expert saying, "this I think, this I will sign my name to." And it is an important example in coordination that minds are changed in the formulation of intelligence estimates, and that the sweat that goes into finding what is it that we really can agree on and separating out that which we cannot is really a remarkable effort. Among the groups I have seen doing this in Government this one ranks very high. Yesterday also Dr. Langer mentioned to you a problem in trying to relate intelligence estimates to policy discussion. The difficulty of getting under our present development in Government the necessary policy information in order to be able to give the best possible appraisal in the intelligence field, I have no additional comment to make to that only to highlight that here is one of the most delicate and difficult problems of coordination. It is difficult because of long tradition in the policy field, short tradition in the intelligence field, and little tradition in the relationship of the two, albeit the policy makers are well convinced that they have been their own intelligence officers for a hundred and fifty years and can continue to be so. However, contact and interchange of ideas in my belief will have an effect upon this and will change it. What are the other problems, what are the things that the IAC does and can do in the field of coordination? It is much of this: insofar as you have around the table the administrative head of all activities of a major sort in the Government in the intelligence field; you have there the capability of agreeing finally "what shall be the relationship of one activity to another." Therefore it is natural that on major questions of coordination activities this is the best place to get them solved. It is the arrangement that wherein it is desirable to establish a new important relationship between activities, to set up a service of

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common concern in the Agency, that the IAC will comment on the Director's recommendation to the NSC before that proceeds. Thus, for example, the Office of Special Operations, the Office of Contact, these are examples of service of common concern. Furthermore, I would like to point out once agreement has been reached that these shall exist, not in each Agency, but only in one, to serve all in common. You cannot say, now we have settled the coordination problem because the very fact that it shall serve them all is the warning that there will be problems and differences of agreement in the deployment of those resources which will be limited in all cases. How well is it being done? We only hope to tell the Secretary of Defense when war is coming or our immediate member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "we have to know this." "We have tried our departmental collection resources and can't get it, it can only be gotten, say, by covert means." You can see how difficult and loaded with the circumstances, personalities, and opinions a problem of this sort can be - very delicate, very difficult and though we would hope that the problem could be settled within a time period of a week, a month, or six months. Some of them take much longer than that. That is because in part personalities take longer as well as functions. There are some examples that I would like to give you of the role of the IAC in coordinating the intelligence community, in making this bridge as firm as it looks. The field of production, collection, dissemination and then some other problems.

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About a year and a half ago the National Security Resources Board became quite aware of the scattered intelligence collected in this Government on economic matters and asked this Agency to see whether some rhyme or reason couldn't be made out of it. I won't go into the details of that except to say that the culminating service of this Agency is to produce for the IAC and then the NSC a recommendation fairly worked over among the agencies and concurred in at the working level for the establishment of a coordinating responsibility in economic matters relating to the national security, that is, intelligence matters. In CIA that is the Office of Research and Reports. Now, you could ask, well, why didn't the agencies just go ahead and do that since obviously it was necessary, the facts which you didn't need to dig too deep to find were there. This makes, I think, an important point that it is not the responsibility of the DCI to sit in his closet and make some intellectual deductions on what ought to be done, and then proceed to do them. I mean things involving coordination, but rather his job is looking over the scene, find out where the problems are, what are the activities that are not properly meshed, and, if necessary, which means if he cannot settle the matter through agreement of the parties under his leadership, then to recommend about the activity to the NSC. Now, there I was pointing to activity, or one or more activities, not so much, or solely in the sense that there are a lot of them that have to be pulled together, that is a separate one and in that case he is to recommend the means of getting coordination and one of those means, as is obvious, to relieve duplication or expenditure of resources would be to set up a service of common concern. That is not the only one, there are others. In this particular case, that is, economic research, Dr. Millikan established a committee

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called the Economic Intelligence Committee and that is composed of the representatives of the agencies. They are busily engaged in making some sense out of all the various efforts in this field. Another difficult problem not as yet successfully solved or as far along to a solution as the economic one is scientific intelligence. Here the problem is that the NSCID or National Security Council Intelligence Directive gave scientific research in intelligence to each agency according to its needs. The military obviously have needs of this sort. The State Department in such things as the Voice problems also has a need. Atomic Energy likewise. The query is how do you isolate out those intelligence matters in this field of national security interests differentiated from departmental interest? You pull them together in terms of an opinion for the President or other policy making officials in the Government. It seems so simple, it is so difficult. It is complicated by the fear that this Agency in proceeding to coordinate will in fact become a competitor, but that is always underlying any acts that call themselves coordination. At the present time there is probably going to be a special survey of this problem to see whether an independent recommendation can be made.

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Another illustration in the production field is to pool the watching process mentioned and discussed by [REDACTED] in his talk, watching what are the intentions and capabilities which would bear upon an imminent attack. Here the Director has seemed a bit heterodox to the orthodox thinkers. Here he didn't say it was the law that placed on me the responsibility to watch, I must, in fact, do the coordination by myself or by my people. Here he recognized the singular interest and need of the military because of their responsibility to defend the nation and established, with the concurrence of the IAC, a Watch Committee composed

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of all the agencies' representatives that meet once a week on the 25X1A9a
watching process to pool the evaluations that [REDACTED] spoke of and to
weigh furthermore and refine further "what does this mean?" The Chairman
of that is G-2 and it is a service for the community and for the Director.
There is no other example to my knowledge that is outstanding of where
this allowing another agency or having another agency lead off has been
done. We see other problems in the current intelligence field that must
be confronted because every agency is engaged in current intelligence.
How do we in between the weekly sessions of the Watch Committee, or in
terms of publications, how do we get a single assorted opinion of the
community? CIA, yes, but the community also.

And finally, under production I would like to mention the field of
intelligence support for Psychological Warfare. Psychological Warfare
and Political Warfare are difficult to distinguish for me. The first
is subsumed under the second. Psychological Warfare merely implying
that broader scope of the word "political." Intelligence support for
political policy is in the State Department, but every agency in the
Pentagon in operational terms has to be interested in psychological
warfare and is, in fact, fitted with a small intelligence staff to
support psychological warfare. And so because of the complexities in
both military and political matters you have immediately a number of
possibly competing interests and the question of who runs it. The
present answer to that may not stand, but at least exists today, is that
the responsibility for the main part of psycho warfare intelligence
support is in the State Department and that it has the responsibility
to make sure that there is an adequate flow of its documentation and
information and take leadership in procuring from the other agencies.

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Our role comes to be one of observer, disinterested, looking for the perfection of this responsibility and aware, we hope, and alert to any difficulties, any grinding of gears so that we can step in and help provide an answer to the problem of intelligence support for psychological warfare.

Now the IAC has interested itself in problems of collection, having set up a special mechanism to bring together the needs of the producing agencies so that they can be racked in order of importance or at least evaluated in terms of which ones are most important. Where should we spend our limited resources? Particularly important is this because in some cases hazard exists. It was mentioned by Mr. Wisner that this is difficult. I should say that is an understatement. Difficult because here you have a coming together of people with quite different points of view. The producer in one of his stage says "I don't care where you get it, but this is what I want." The only trouble with that is that the producer when he was doing research work was his own collector, that is, in the university stage, and he was very much aware of where you get certain kinds of information and the fact that it was his mind thinking through the hypotheses and at the same time thinking of how you get it, he has many times forgotten. Meanwhile just to say "we will tell you what we want and you go and get it," is not necessarily efficient from the point of view of the collector. In an effort not to decide this question but to explore it we have recently been seeking to bring together some knowledge of capabilities for collection to people who have the questions to ask. Thus, let me take, perhaps, an imperfect example and that is O/O/C, Office of Contact. It is imperative that if you are going to have a network of people in the United States collecting they need to be well guided. However, if the questions that bother intelligence researchers

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most have to do with matters not collectable through such means, O/O/C, Contact, will tend to starve for guidance. The theoretical position then is impossible. What really is needed is some indication by the Office of Contact of its capabilities - "we can't collect that one, that has to be done covertly." We can't help much, but did you think of this because the amount of information we need is great, although the critical information may be relatively small.

In the same framework of collection you have an effort recently on the part of the Bureau of the Budget to strengthen the hand of the State Department in its administration of the collection system, the Foreign Service, for economic reporting. An Executive Order was signed by the President making more firm their responsibility to make the decisions among the competing agencies for the time and services of Commercial Attaches. The problem then faces the State Department, "yes, we can make the decision, but you don't make it out of thin air. Where do we get our guidance?" Here they turned to CIA and said, "would you, using your Economic Intelligence Committee," that I mentioned earlier, "would you undertake to bring together the agencies and try to ferret out what are the most important things in the interest of national security that we should bend our efforts to." That effort now is proceeding to get an answer to the State Department. I would like to mention that a concern also of the IAC is to provide intelligence support to agencies of the Government which may be newly set up or of old agencies which have newly defined needs. Who provides the intelligence for the Civil Defense Agency, who provides it for the Coast Guard, which in peace time is under Treasury and under Navy in wartime? There are other agencies. We can't say we will provide it because if we were to try that in terms

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of production we would be getting into the setting up of staffs to cover the departmental intelligence fields of responsibility. Then how do you do it? Do they make their request to a central point here and we bring it together? Or do they go case by case to each agency as the material indicates? That is the kind of problem we are confronted with. I won't bother to go into the solution. It is a simple one.

Now further you wouldn't think perhaps that dissemination of intelligence is a very difficult matter. Everybody needs it distributed, but the minute you talk about intelligence relating to the national security you are talking about classified material, much of the time sensitive. Here you really have the battle of the needs and no principle. We hear more of that. I would warn you to inspect it closely because it can be a defense where defense is not warranted as well as a useful principle. What shall be the dissemination of intelligence to, say, Federal Security Agency? Do National Estimates go there? If the other agencies such as Coast Guard, Agriculture, and others on occasion, help in the development of a National Estimate or problem which is between estimating and policy should they get copies of the document? you would say, "yes," at once but then you have to stop and look into how wide can you get in the dissemination of classified material. It is not only within our Government that the problem exists, it is as between governments. Who should help whom and how much. What are the nations that are sure? Look at the bigger one, which hits both production and dissemination. It also hits at this moment in less degree collection. Who is going to provide this for NATO? NATO has a Standing Group and under that an Intelligence Committee. What is the United States to do: (a) give itself to support

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duties, share in the Intelligence Committee to the Standing Group;

(b) when we send that in do we care who gets it? Does it make any difference that there are 11 other countries of differing degrees of security? There are governments in different degrees of stability or their degree of penetration by the Communists vary, and other factors. How long would it take to have a leak of important information estimating Soviet strength? So that when you get into it you find that the easy problem of dissemination which usually conveys to mind a big reproduction machine spilling it out like the Post Office mail and everybody believes that the flow of information is highly desirable you want everybody to know, everybody who should at the right time. And that, like happiness, is difficult to do.

Now I would like to take just a few minutes to talk in, maybe there are two, simple terms. Maybe, however, you will get something out of it, not because of what I say is going to be new to you, but maybe my pointing it out will make you a little more alert as you go on about your new job. I have messed around some with amateur photography. As I was trying to find a way to get across the point to you I thought this would help. The other Sunday I was taking some pictures of a neighbor's children and she insisted on coming along despite the fact that I tried as politely as possible to suggest that we could get along. She was eternally fussing with the children and telling them to smile pretty, and don't wiggle, won't you cooperate with Mr. Reber and so on. So that there wasn't a single individual taking the picture, we had two of them, and you have been in family groups when more than two were involved. Without pushing the point too hard I want to emphasize that where primary responsibility reside there should rest leadership. We hope it is coincident to time, person, and place, and that person has got to not reject suggestions,

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but he has to conduct himself in such a way as to be the leader. He snaps the picture. That may make him the servant of the whole, but nonetheless the leadership rests.

I would like to mention also a caption "functional astigmatism." You know a lens that is cheap is frequently imperfectly ground at the edges so that you see sharpness in the center and as you move to the edges things get fuzzy. This is one of the continuing problems of the bureaucrat because what happens is that as he moves from dead center with it clear what he should do, then he moves on out and he mistakes that astigmatism for a challenge to new horizons. And he is also looking over the fence at the other green grass. Sometimes it is called aggrandizement. You will be better off I think in relating yourself to other functions and thereby being coordinated. Try and get rid of your astigmatism, try and make your lens sharp as to what you are to do. If you think clearly you will be helping a great deal.

I would like to mention the word "overdevelopment." When you put a picture in the developer and it isn't quite right keep pouring it on, that is, keep it in longer, until it gets darker. When you take it out and hold it up to the light for awhile you find that you have brought out all the grain, little pebbles, in the emotion. I speak of this because I think one of our curses is overworking unimportant matters. It is a matter of perspective admittedly, but you can bring small points up to the surface and make them obnoxious by overworking them. I would like to speak of the curse of equipment. You have all seen that tourist loaded to the gills with all kinds of photographic baggage. He is out to take real pictures. So you have seen the new man in photography spend a thousand bucks to line himself up all the equipment so he will

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have the latest and best. Have you ever seen some of the pictures those people produce? They didn't learn, they haven't learned that it is not really the equipment, but the technical matters. I am now relating this to coordination mechanism, committees and such. Our only means to an end and back of all there has to be a clear vision of what is to be accomplished. Don't become an amasser of the accouterments of coordination.

Over in the State Department if you will get the biographic register you will find that under each name, back in the 30's these got in, chairman of committee; member of certain committees, and that gives you more interest. Where as a matter of fact I figure they get no credit at all for that because it has simply a lateral responsibility of their function. If it is the main responsibility they are chairman, if it is a responsibility not just a matter of prestige and if you don't have the main responsibility but a colateral one you are members. You don't get paid extra, that is just in the job. Because as General Smith himself says, "your responsibility is not just this, but they are also this way." Moral, don't load yourself down, don't give depth to the formalities and mechanisms as such, be critical of them as such, be critical in them in terms of "does it get the job done." I would like to add to that last point I used, the word "critical." This morning Mr. Wisner spoke of intellectual honesty. And then [REDACTED] spoke of intellectual curoosity. I would like to speak of intellectual critical ability, not unrelated to the first two but I mean this that if you wish to be easily coordinated by others and if you wish to easily coordinate try to retain an objective mind. Wait until all the stuff is in before you take your

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position. That doesn't mean to say you can't move faster to setting up hypotheses but having set them up be flexible enough to see them knocked down. A point said perhaps a different way earlier by [REDACTED] With that too I have used up my time.

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